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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This matter is on appeal from the final decision of the Workforce Appeals Board
(the "Board") entered on November 24, 2009 in the matter of Salt Lake Donated Dental
Services, Inc. v. Workforce Appeals Board, Department of Workforce Services, Appeal
No. 09-R-01460, with respect to a former employee of Appellant, Stephen P. Vuyk (the
"Claimant"). The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code section 35A-4-508(8).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1: Did the Board err in its application of Utah Admin. Code section R994405-202(2) ("Rule 2") in determining Appellant (the "Employer") failed to demonstrate
the Claimant lacked knowledge of the conduct that the Employer expected?
Standard of Review: The findings of the Board as to the facts will not be
disturbed by the Court as long as the facts are supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the Court. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4508(8)(e); Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997); Whitear v. Labor
Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1998). The Board's factual findings, however,
related to its conclusion that the Claimant did not have the requisite knowledge of the
Employer's expectations are not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light
of the whole record before the Court.
With respect to the Board's application of the facts to the operative legal
provisions, this Court defers to the Board's interpretation and application of such
1

provisions so long as the Board's decision is reasonable and rational.

Adeles

Housekeeping v. Dept. of Employment Sec, 757 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah App. 1988). The
Board's application of the present facts to Rule 2 is neither reasonable nor rational.
Further, Rule 2 provides that the knowledge element of just cause is demonstrated
if "the claimant had knowledge of the conduct the employer expected." The Board's
interpretation and application of Rule 2, however, required the Employer to demonstrate
not only that the Claimant had actual knowledge of the expected conduct but also that the
Claimant must have the necessary skills and be capable of meeting the Employer's
expectations (such additional requirements appear to have been confused with the
requirements of "control," as discussed below). The pjain language of Rule 2 does not
require demonstration of such unspecified additional i^ems. Interpretation of the plain
language of Rule 2 is a question of law, and such is to be given no deference and is
reviewed for correctness. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4-5Q8(8)(e).
Issue 2: Did the Board err in its application of ptah Admin. Code section R994405-202(3) ("Rule 3") in determining the Employer failed to demonstrate that the
conduct causing the Claimant's termination was within tjie Claimant's control?
Standard of Review: The findings of the Bj)ard as to the facts will not be
disturbed by the Court as long as the facts are supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the Cou^t. UTAH CODE ANN. § 35A-4508(8)(e); Drake v. Industrial Comm'n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997); Whitear v. Labor
Comm'n, 973 P.2d 982, 984 (Utah App. 1998). The Board's factual findings, however,

related to its conclusions that the Claimant did not have the ability to perform his job
duties in a satisfactory manner and that he made a good faith effort to succeed in his job
are not supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light of the whole record
before the Court.
With respect to the Board's application of the facts to the operative legal
provisions, this Court defers to the Board's interpretation and application of such
provisions so long as the Board's decision is reasonable and rational.

Adele's

Housekeeping v. Dept. of Employment Sec, 757 P.2d 480, 482 (Utah App. 1988). The
Board's application of the present facts to Rule 3 is neither reasonable nor rational.
Further, Rule 3 provides that the control element of just cause is demonstrated if
the claimant had the ability to perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner but did not
make a good faith effort to do so. The Board's interpretation and application of Rule 3,
however, precludes as immaterial whether the Claimant believed he could perform the
job duties in a satisfactory manner. The plain language of Rule 3 does not prohibit as
immaterial whether the Claimant believed he could perform the job duties in a
satisfactory manner. Interpretation of the plain language of Rule 3 is a question of law,
and such is to be given no deference and is reviewed for correctness. UTAH CODE ANN. §
35A-4-508(8)(e).
Issue 3: Is the Board's failure to consider the supplemental grounds for the
Claimant's termination for lying about his qualifications on his resume and elsewhere
supported by both law and facts?
3

Standard of Review:

The Board failed entirely to consider or rule on the

Employer's request to supplement the Claimant's grounds for termination to include
lying (about his ability to speak Spanish and his level of education) on his resume, in his
employment interview, and throughout his employment with the Employer, which actions
constitute just cause for termination pursuant to Utah Admin. Code sections R994-405208(1) and R994-405-208(3).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND PROVISIONS
The following legal authorities are attached as Addendum A:
1.

Utah Admin. Code § R994-405-202(2) ("Rule 2").

2.

Utah Admin. Code § R994-405-202(3) ("Rule 3").
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the final decision of the Board in an adjudicative

proceeding regarding the issues of whether the Employer terminated employment of the
Claimant, a former employee of the Employer, for just cause pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Ann. section 35A-4-405(2)(a) and whether the Employer, as a reimburseable
employer, is entitled to relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann.
section 35A-4-307(l) with respect to certain unemployment benefits paid to the
Claimant. (The Board's decision is attached as Addendum B.)

B.

Course of Proceedings
The Employer terminated the Claimant's employment on April 16, 2009.

(CA

007.) The Claimant shortly thereafter filed with the Utah Department of Workforce
Services (the "Department") a claim for unemployment benefits. (CA 001.)

On April

27, 2009, the Department informed the Employer that the Claimant had filed for
unemployment benefits (the Claimant reporting the reason for separation as a reduction in
force) and asked the Employer to answer certain questions and to supply certain
documents related to the Claimant's termination. (CA 005.)

The Employer timely

complied with the Department's requests. (CA 005-017.) Based on the statements and
information provided by the Employer and the Claimant, the Department issued decisions
that the Claimant was not terminated for just cause and that the Employer was
responsible for payment of his unemployment benefits. (CA 018.) On August 24, 2009,
the Employer timely appealed the Department's decisions to an administrative law judge
within the Department. (CA 019-021.) Thereafter, a telephone hearing was scheduled
and held on September 21, 2009. (CA 022-044.) The administrative law judge issued an
appeal decision on September 22, 2009 wherein she determined that the Employer had
demonstrated the culpability element of just cause for termination but that the Employer
had failed to demonstrate the elements of knowledge and control. (CA 046-048.) The
Employer timely appealed to the Board on October 20, 2009. (CA 055-060.) The Board
affirmed the administrative law judge's decision on November 24, 2009. (Addendum B.)
The Employer timely requested the Board to reconsider, which the Board denied. (CA
5

082-119, 120-123.) The Employer timely filed its Petition for Review with the Utah
Court of Appeals on January 15, 2010. (CA 127-129.)
C.

Disposition in the Agency Below
The Board concluded that the Employer failed to demonstrate the elements of

knowledge and control with respect to the termination of the Claimant's employment for
just cause.

(Addendum B.)

The Board further concluded that, as a reimburseable

employer, the Employer is ineligible for relief of charges with respect to the Claimant's
unemployment benefits. (Addendum B.)
D.

Statement of the Facts
1.

On June 4, 2008, the Claimant contacted by email the executive director of

Appellant regarding his interest in a job position with thb Employer wherein he indicated
that he had had at least ten years of fundraising and management experience. (CA 114.)
2.

From 2005 through September 2008, the Claimant worked as a director of a

Utah nonprofit organization, Muscular Dystrophy Association of Utah (annual budget of
$740,000, which amount is roughly twice the amount of the Employer's budget), wherein
he managed all of that organization's fundraising efforts and he personally organized
special events and fundraising programs. (CA 106-10J7, 114-115.) The Claimant also
worked for many years prior to September 29, 2008 as an emcee/director for all game day
promotions for the Utah Grizzlies and the Utah Freeze. (CA 114-115.)
3.

Shortly before September 29, 2008, the Claimant presented his resume to,

and was interviewed by, the executive director for the Employer wherein he claimed that
6

he spoke Spanish at a conversational level and that he was a graduate of Westminster
College. (CA115.)
4.

The Claimant was hired by the Employer as a professional fund raiser on

September 29, 2008.

(CA 029.)

The Claimant was hired because the Employer's

previous corporate and government grants were dwindling due to the poor economy.
(CA 107-108.)

Prior to the Claimant, the Employer had not needed, and had not

employed, a professional fund raiser since 2002. (CA 108-109.)
5.

The Claimant held himself out to the Employer to be, and he considered

himself to be, an experienced fund raiser. (CA 031, 036, 042.)
6.

The Claimant's primary job was to raise funds for the Employer in the

amount of $15,625 per month, or $187,500 per year. (CA 007, 009-013, 029, 034.)
7.

Shortly after hire, on or about October 2, 2008, the Claimant and the

Employer memorialized the Claimant's job position and job duties with the Employer,
and the Claimant specifically agreed in writing that his primary duty for the Employer
was to raise $15,625 per month, or $187,500 per year. (CA 012-013, 036, 040.)
8.

The Claimant agreed that the amount of $15,625, or $187,500 per year, was

reasonable and that he was entirely capable of reaching that goal. (CA 012-013, 040.)
9.

Throughout his employment with the Employer, the executive director of

the Employer met with the Claimant monthly to discuss how he was progressing on the
fund-raising goal. (CA 009-011, 020, 030.)

7

10.

The Claimant indicated at these monthly meetings that he was well aware

of the financial goal and that he was working on various projects that he claimed would
accomplish such goal. (CA 030.)
11.

The Employer offered the Claimant assistance (by the executive director,

by staff support, and/or by the board of directors through its marketing committee) to
achieve his financial goal, but the Claimant generally refused such help. (CA 010, 030,
042.)
12.

The Claimant was allowed the first three months of employment with the

Employer to get settled into the position, and the Enjiployer's expectation of raising
$15,625 per month began in earnest as of January 20091 (CA 010, 030, 033, 040, 108.)
The Claimant and the Employer agreed that this three n^onth "ramp up" period would be
sufficient. (CA 010, 108.) The Claimant conducted several events during the ramp-up
period, however, the events did not raise enough funds fo offset the costs to conduct the
events. (CA 108-109.)
13.

The Employer provided the Claimant with ready-made projects to raise

funds, such as billing Medicaid, which could be don^ immediately upon hire and at
anytime to supplement the Claimant's funding goal in between his projects. (CA 108109.) Throughout his employment, the Claimant did not utilize any of these ready-made
projects. (CA 108-109.)
14.

During the first three months of employment with the Employer and

because the Claimant was physically not working the hours the Employer expected he
8

would as a full-time fund raiser, the Claimant was changed from salary to hourly wage.
(CA020, 110-111.)
15.

On January 11, 2009, the Claimant was given a verbal warning for

falsifying his time card. (CA Oil.) A few days prior, the security system for the
Employer indicated that the Claimant left the office at 1:03 p.m., but the Claimant
indicated on his time card that he left the office at 4:15 p.m. (CA 110-111.)
16.

From the date of hire through January 28, 2009, the Claimant had raised a

total of $30 for the Employer. (CA 010.)
17.

Thereafter, for the entire first fiscal quarter of 2009, the Claimant raised for

the Employer an average of $3,489 per month. (CA 007, 009, 029.)
18.

On January 28, 2009, the Claimant was given his first verbal warning

regarding not meeting his fund raising goal. (CA010.)
19.

Beginning after January 28, 2009 and for the following several months, the

Claimant utilized the Employer's computer to search for available jobs and send resumes
to other employers. (CA 110.)
20.

On February 12, 2009, the Claimant was again given verbal warning (by

the Employer's chairman of the board of directors and executive director) regarding not
meeting his fund raising goal. (CA 009-010.)
21.

The Claimant was notified that he would be terminated by the end of March

2009 if he did not raise at least $5,000 per month. (CA 009-010, 108.)
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22.

As of March 31, 2009, the Claimant had missed deadlines on two fund

raising projects, and the Employer was forced to take back responsibility from the
Claimant for those projects. (CA 010.)
23.

On April 9, 2009, in conjunction with an Unsuccessful fund raising event (a

hockey night with the Grizzlies hockey game), the Claimant was given his final warning
regarding not meeting his fund raising goal. (CA 010, 109.)
24.

On April 15, 2009, the Claimant's main fund raising event ("Brilliant

Smiles Tasting Event" at the McCune mansion) had to be cancelled because only 18
tickets had been sold, which required at least 50 tickets to be sold for the Employer to
break even on the event, and the event was poorly planned and marketed, and the event
ultimately cost the Employer $1,200. (CA 009, 021 109-110.) The manager of the
McCune mansion contacted the Employer to recommend that the event be cancelled.
(CA118.)
25.

On April 16, 2009, the Claimant was terminated by the Employer

approximately seven months from the date of hire. (CA 029.)
26.

Subsequent to the Claimant's termination, the clinic manager of the

Employer, in addition to her other duties, performed tlie Claimant's job of fund raising,
and she brought in funds for the Employer of approximately $10,000 per month. (CA
032,118.)
27.

Throughout his approximate seven monihs of employment, the Claimant

raised an average of only $2,295 per month, or a total of $16,065 of the required
10

$187,500, which is less than 10% of the amount agreed to be raised annually and which
was not enough to pay a fraction of his own wages. (CA 009, 029-030, 106.)
28.

The Claimant generally failed to complete fund raising projects, and he

often postponed events. (CA 019-020, 030-031, 109.)
29.

The Claimant never met the Employer's expectations. (CA 031.)

30.

On September 28, 2009, the Employer, through its pro bono legal counsel,

supplemented its grounds for termination of the Claimant by finding after an
investigation of the Claimant's present claims that the Claimant had lied on his resume,
had lied in his employment interview, and had lied throughout his employment with the
Employer with respect to earning a Bachelor's Degree from Westminster College located
in Salt Lake City, Utah, and about his ability to speak Spanish. (CA 052-053, 111, 114115.)
31.

The Claimant testified in the hearing in this matter that he did the best he

could and that he "did his job." (CA 039, 042.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Board, upholding a decision from an administrative law judge for the
Department, erroneously concluded that the Employer failed to establish the elements of
knowledge and control in order to terminate the Claimant for just cause pursuant to Utah
Admin. Code section R994-405-202. (Addendum B, CA 045-048.) The Board also
failed entirely to rule on whether supplemental grounds for the Claimant's termination
constituted just cause. (Addendum B.)
ll

Rule 2 and Rule 3 provide the framework arid the only guidance from the
Department for determining whether an employer may terminate an employee for just
cause. The plain language of these rules, as well as thp record developed in this case,
simply does not support the Board's findings and interpretations of the Department's own
promulgated rules. Further, the Board's findings are 4>ften based on speculation with
little supporting argument or evidence as to why th0 factors relied upon are more
indicative of knowledge or control than those factors expressed in the plain language of
the rules themselves. Finally, the Employer kept and entered into the record in this
matter meticulous records regarding the Claimant's job performance and history, yet the
Board viewed such properly authenticated documentation (submitted upon request of the
Department) with suspicion, as if the Employer had fabricated the documents for its own
benefit.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE BOARD ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE EMPLOYER
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENT QF KNOWLEDGE.

A.

Plain Language
Utah Code Ann. section 35A-4-405(2)(a) providejs that a former employee will not

be entitled to unemployment insurance if the employer terminated the former employee
for just cause. Pursuant to Utah Admin. Code section R994-405-202, three elements
must be present to establish just cause: culpability, knowledge, and control. With respect
to the knowledge element at issue presently, Rule 2 provides that such may be
12

demonstrated simply if "the claimant had knowledge of the conduct expected." This is
subjective and straightforward; either the employee knew what the employer expected or
not. See, e.g., Stone V. Dept. of Workforce Services, 2005 WL 2303809 (Utah App.
2005)(Knowledge element was established as employee simply knew of her employer's
reasonable expectation); Whipple v. Workforce Appeals Bd., 2004 WL 2903980 (Utah
App. 2004)(Employee had knowledge of what was expected of her under an agreement
describing her job responsibilities and work hours; "she simply chose not to comply");
Snow v. Dept. of Workforce Services, 2003 WL 22208911 (Utah App. 2003)(Employee
had knowledge of the expectations that she report to work or call in to report her
absences, which she did not do); Powless v. Dept. of Workforce Services, 1999 WL
33244754 (Utah App. 1999)(same; "She knew it was necessary for her to work...").
Rule 2 further provides that knowledge may not be established unless the
employer gave a "clear explanation of the expected behavior."

The requirement to

provide a clear explanation is also straightforward; either the employer clearly explained
to the employee what behavior was expected or not. See, e.g., Green v. Board of Review
of Indus. Com'n of Utah, 728 P.2d 996 (Utah 1986)(A written commitment from busdriver employee to "not have any more accidents" was not a clear explanation of the
expected behavior).
From the Employer's initial employment interview with the Claimant until his
termination nearly seven months later, the Employer discussed repeatedly (and at least
monthly) that the Employer expected the Claimant to conduct himself with fund raising
13

activities such that he brought in $15, 625 per month, or|$187,500 a year. (CA 009-013,
029-30, 034, 036, 040) The Employer specifically drafted, and obtained the Claimant's
signature on, a job description agreement dated October 2, 2008 wherein the Employer
clearly and in writing detailed the Employer's expectations and the Claimant expressly
acknowledged such expectations.

(CA 012-013.) Fiirther, the Claimant specifically

admitted at the hearing in this matter that he subjectively and actually knew what was
expected of him; "[D]o you know that you had to obtain $15,000 a month roughly, or
$187,000 all together? Yes, all together. That was the expectation...." (CA 040.) Based
on this uncontroverted evidence and on the Claimant's own admission, the Employer has
demonstrated that the Employer gave not only a clqar explanation of the expected
conduct but also that the Claimant subjectively knew wh^t that expectation was.
The Board indicated in its decision, however, that, in addition to demonstrating
that the Claimant knew what the Employer's expectations were, the Employer must also
apparently demonstrate that the Claimant had the necessary skills and was capable of
meeting the expectations. (Addendum B.) The Board's decision provides:
On appeal, the Employer cites the job description signed by the Claimant
on October 2, 2008, as proof that the Claimant had the necessary
knowledge and skills to meet the Employer's expectations. Signing the
document indicates that the Claimant knew he was expected to meet certain
fund raising goals each month. It is not proofs however, that the Claimant
was capable of meeting those expectations or j:hat failure to meet them
meant the Claimant failed to make a good faith efjfort to do so.
(Addendum B.) There is, however, no skill or capability requirement in Rule 2. Further,
the Board acknowledged that signing the job descripllion document indicates that the
14

Claimant knew what the Employer expected of him. (Addendum B.) Elsewhere in the
decision, the Board specifically concluded that the Employer had demonstrated the
requirements of Rule 2 as the Claimant possessed the requisite knowledge of the
Employer's clearly-explained expectations:
While the Claimant understood the fund raising expectations, and while he
and the Employer reviewed his progress each month, he was never put on
notice that failure to meet the expectations would result in his termination
until the issuance of the written warning, which was only several days
before he was discharged.
(Addendum B.) As explained in more detail below, Rule 2 does not require that the
Employer put the Claimant on notice that his failure to meet expectations would result in
termination. Rule 2 simply requires that the Employer provide a clear explanation of the
expected conduct (which the Board so concluded; "the Employer reviewed his progress
each month") and that the Claimant understood the expectation ("the Claimant
understood the fund raising expectations"). (Addendum B.)
Accordingly, pursuant to the plain language of Rule 2, the Employer
demonstrated, and the Claimant himself admitted and the Board so concluded, that a clear
explanation was made and the Claimant subjectively knew what those expectations were.
Rule 2 simply does not require anything else.
B,

One Permissible Method to Demonstrate Knowledge
Rule 2 provides that a specific "warning is one way to show the claimant had

knowledge of expected conduct" (emphasis added). Forgetting for the moment that the
Board apparently considers that a written warning is the only way in which to
15

demonstrate the knowledge element of just cause, the Bciard indicates in its decision that
the Employer's "self-serving 'discipline log'" is not sufficient to demonstrate that the
Claimant received numerous written and verbal waitings of the expected conduct.
(Addendum B, CA 009-011.) The Board also indicated that there was no indication when
the discipline log was prepared, if the Claimant ever sa\y the document, or if the specific
acts in the document were ever discussed with the Claimant.

(Addendum B.) The

Board's erroneous dismissal, even downright suspicion^ of this document is unfounded
and entirely without merit. First of all, this document Was submitted by the Employer
and made part of the record, the authenticity and facts of which were unchallenged and
uncontroverted by the Claimant, the administrative law judge or the Department. (CA
009-011, 028-029.) The document contains the exact (jlates of, and relates in detail the
events with respect to, the various and numerous attempts the Employer made to provide
the Claimant with a clear explanation of the Employee's expectations. (CA 009-011.)
The document is in fact a spreadsheet that the Employdr creates for all of its employees
so that the Employer can keep track of each employee's discipline events. (CA 009-011,
106.) For the drafter of the Board's decision to imputje some sort wrong doing by the
Employer by introducing the document or to itiiply that the document was
contemporaneously created by the Employer to justify the Claimant's termination is an
affront to the Employer.
While the discipline log was not initially submitted into evidence to demonstrate a
written warning, it in fact does qualify under Rule 2 £s evidence of numerous written
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warnings given to the Claimant of the Employer's expectations. The language of Rule 2
does not require that the Claimant actually sign the written warning nor does it require
that the Claimant actually see the document, as the Board suggests in its decision must be
present. (Addendum B.) Further, the Claimant made no objection to the discipline log
whatsoever; the presumption must be that he has no objection to the facts contained
therein. (CA 028-029.) What is required by Rule 2 is that the warning be written down
(which the discipline log certainly is), that the Claimant be afforded the opportunity to
correct the objectionable conduct (which the Claimant was afforded since his first
warning in January of 2009), and that, if the employer had a disciplinary procedure in
place, such must be followed (which the Employer did). (CA007-011.)
The Board further and erroneously assumes that, in conjunction with a written
warning, there must be some unspecified period of time between the issuance of a written
warning and the actual termination. Assuming again, arguendo, that a written warning is
the only way to demonstrate the knowledge element of just cause, the language of Rule 2
does not require any particular passage of time between the issuance of a written warning
and termination. What is required is that the Claimant simply be afforded the opportunity
to correct objectionable conduct, which could be in an hour, a day, or a year. In the
present case, as evidenced by the various events and discussions noted in the discipline
log, the Claimant was given multiple opportunities to correct his behavior, starting in
January of 2009. (CA 009-011.) In addition, the Claimant was simply and finally
terminated a week after receiving a formal written warning on April 9, 2009, which he in
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fact signed, and such written warning was followed by a period of one week to correct
the objectionable conduct. (CA 008.) Specifically, the Claimant had, during the first
week of April 2009, conducted an event (a hockey night with the Grizzlies) that failed
miserably and directly led to the written warning on Aptil 9, 2009. (CA 010, 109.) The
Claimant's next event ("Brilliant Smiles Tasting Event" at the McCune mansion) was
scheduled a few weeks later on April 23, 2009. (CA 009,021, 109-110.) Once, however,
the Employer learned (from the manager of the McCun£ mansion) that the event needed
to be canceled entirely as it had been poorly managed, poorly marketed, the invitations
went out too late, and the ticket sales were insignificant, it became clear to the Employer
that the Claimant failed to correct the objectionable cpnduct within the week, i.e., he
failed to actually work to promote the next event after tile disastrous hockey night and he
was terminated for it. (CA 009,021, 108-109, 118.) Weed, there are many instances
where employers providing a week's notice to an employee of objectionable conduct
would be more than sufficient warning to correct that conduct. See, e.g., Kehl v. Board
of Review of Indus. Com'n of Utah, 700 P.2d 1129 (Utqh 1995)(Four days from previous
written warning for violation of safety rules was sufficient warning to correct the
objectionable behavior).
C.

Anticipation of Negative Effect
The Board indicated in its decision that, in conjunction with the written warning,

the Employer must also demonstrate that the Claimant knew his conduct would actually
lead to termination ("Until that time [when he received a written warning on April 9,
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2009, indicating that if he didn't correct his behavior, he would be terminated], the
Claimant did not know that his conduct would lead to his discharge."). (Addendum B.)
Rule 2 does not, however, contain such a knowledge of termination requirement; the
language simply provides that the Claimant "should have been able to anticipate the
negative effect of the conduct," which could be having hours reduced, written or verbal
warning, or some other negative effect. The Board suggests that the only negative effect
must be termination, but Rule 2 simply does not so provide. (Addendum B.) The words
"termination,""discharge," or "separation from employment" are not used, and the
standard is an objective one, i.e., a reasonable person in the Claimant's position should
have been able to anticipate that, if the objectionable conduct was not corrected (the
Claimant did not raise the funds), there would be some sort of negative effect, which
could include termination but could include some other unspecified negative effect. A
reasonable person should have been able to anticipate that, if the job of fund raising was
not completed, there would be negative consequences to them and to the Employer. In
fact, however, after realizing that the Claimant was not remotely reaching his financial
goal, the chairman of the board of directors and the executive director for the Employer
met with the Claimant on February 12, 2009, and, at that time, the Claimant was
specifically notified that he would be terminated by March 31, 2009, if he did not raise at
a minimum $5,000 per month to at least cover his wages, which he did not do. (CA 009010, 108.) Accordingly, the Claimant not only could anticipate the negative effect, he
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was actually informed of the effect should he fail to teise the requisite funds for the
Employer.
In the present case, the Employer gave the Claimant numerous verbal and written
warnings that, should he fail to correct his past objectionable conduct with respect to his
upcoming fund raising events, he would be terminated

Vs indicated above, such written

warnings are but one of the ways to demonstrate the knowledge element. Accordingly,
either by written warning or by complying with the plain language requirements of Rule
2, the Employer has established the element of knowledge.
II.

THE BOARD ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDEb THAT THE EMPLOYER
FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE ELEMENT OF CONTROL.
Rule 3 provides that, to demonstrate the element of control, the conduct causing

the discharge must have been within the claimant's control in that the claimant must have
had the ability to perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner but that such claimant
did not make a good faith effort to do so. In other worqs, Rule 3 provides a two part test
wherein the Employer must demonstrate the Claimant (i) had the ability to do the job but
(2) did not make a good faith effort to do it. See also Nelson v. Dept. of Employment
Sec, 801 P.2d 158, 162 (Utah App. 1990)("The behavior or conduct must have been
within the power and capacity of the employee to control or prevent."); Montoya v. Dept.
of Workforces Services, 2009 WL 38612 (Utah App. 2009)(Employee knew the safety
protocol, and it was within his control to follow it or not].J, but he simply did not do so).
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A.

The Claimant Had the Ability to do the Job
With respect to the first part of the two part test, either the Claimant had the ability

to do the job or not. The uncontroverted evidence and testimony in this matter reveals
that the Claimant did have the ability to do the job.

Without analysis, the Board

summarily concludes that whether the Claimant believed he could reach the fund raising
goal/expectation of the Employer was immaterial as to whether he had the ability to
perform his job duties.

(Addendum B.) Such is entirely material, however, as the

Claimant was hired as (and he held and continues to hold himself out to be) an
experienced fund raiser ("I was an experienced fundraiser"). (CA 031, 036, 042.) If
anyone knew what was or was not possible as a fund raiser, or specifically whether he
had the ability to perform the job duties of fund raiser in a satisfactory manner, it was the
Claimant himself. Further, the Claimant's own admissions are very much material in this
matter.
The Claimant indicated on his resume, and the Employer so confirmed with the
Claimant's references, that he was indeed an experienced fund raiser who, for apparently
more than 10 years, organized special events and fund-raising programs, and who for
many years managed all of the fund raising activities with respect to the Muscular
Dystrophy Association of Utah, a non-profit organization with an annual budget of
$740,000 (roughly double that of the Employer's budget). (CA 106-107, 114-115.)
Further, the Claimant was specifically asked by the Employer what amount of fund
raising he was capable of obtaining, and he and the Employer together arrived at the
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financial goal amount of $15,625 a month, or $187,500 a year, which the Claimant
indicated that not only did he have the ability to raise that much money but that such
amount was reasonable ("And did you say that that [raising $15,625 a month, or
$187,000 a year] was reasonable, as you were capable of doing that? [Claimant] Yes.").
(CA 040, 107.)
Accordingly, by his own repeated admissions that the Claimant was an
"experienced" fund raiser and by the fact that he was employed by a previous nonprofit
employer as a successful professional fund raiser and manager of other fund raisers, the
Employer has met its burden of demonstrating that the Claimant had the ability to
perform the duties of the job.
B.

The Claimant Did Not Act in Good Faith
With respect to the second part of the two part control test, the Board specifically

found that the Claimant made a good faith effort to succeed with the Employer but that he
was somehow hampered by the economy, the long-term nature of fund raising and the
fact that most of the events he planned happened after he was discharged. (Addendum
B.) The Board's conclusion, however, is simply not supported by the facts.
1.

Economy.

The Employer hired the Claimant precisely because of the

downturn in the economy. (CA 107-108.) By August/September of 2008, it became
clear to the Employer that the Employer's previous corporate and government grants
were dwindling due to the poor economy, and the Employer would have to somehow
supplement its funding to make ends meet. (CA 107-108.) The Employer had not
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employed a professional fund raiser since 2002, and the Claimant was hired specifically
because he was a professional fund raiser who indicated that, both at his interview and
throughout his employment with the Employer, he was able to raise funds in spite of the
economy.

(CA 108-109.) The Claimant's unsubstantiated intimations at the hearing

(and the administrative law judge's erroneous assumptions from such intimations at the
hearing followed by the Board's subsequent erroneous conclusions) that the economy
somehow played a role in whether he made a good faith effort at fund raising, and the
further suggestion that the economy was good when the Claimant started working for the
Employer, but then tanked later thereby affecting his ability to raise funds for the
Employer, are misleading and false. (Addendum B, CA 038-039, 042.) The Claimant,
when asked about what part the economy played in his failure to obtain (even remotely)
his financial goal, indicated that he had brought up the bad economy because he knew
that the executive director of the Employer could not raise as much funding as she could
otherwise; and hence the need for a professional fundraiser ("What part did the economy
play in you not obtaining money? [the Claimant] Well, no, I mentioned the economy
because of the grants that [the Employer's executive director] mentioned that she wasn't
able to bring in...."). (CA 042.) For the Board to conclude that the Claimant made a
good faith effort but was hampered by the economy is completely at odds with reality and
with what the Employer and the Claimant had specifically agreed to and understood
throughout his employment with the Employer. (Addendum B.) The Claimant was
aware of the poor economy from the beginning, agreed that the fund-raising goal was
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reasonable in spite of the economy, and only brought up the economy in the hearing to
demonstrate that his fund-raising position was indeed needed by the Employer.
2.

Long-term nature of fund raising. At the time the Claimant was hired, the

Employer gave the Claimant a ninety-day "ramp up" period (October, November, and
December 2008) in order to get his fund-raising projects going. (CA 040, 108.) The
Claimant and the Employer agreed from the very beginning that a ninety-day period
would be sufficient to get the Claimant's various events and projects off the ground. (CA
010, 108.) In fact, the Employer extended the ramp up period when it was recognized in
late January that the Claimant was struggling to meet his first month's financial goals (he
had only brought in $30 for the entire month of January), and the Employer reduced the
fund-raising goal to $5,000 a month for the following few months, i.e., he was to simply
cover his own wages (which he never could do) until he got things going in more earnest.
(CA 010, 108-109.) Further, the Employer had provided the Claimant with ready-made
projects that the Claimant simply did not do, such as simply billing Medicaid. (CA 108109.) The Claimant's mere intimation that fund raising is of a long-term nature does not
necessary mean that he made a good faith effort to do the job, as the Board erroneously
concluded.
Further, the Board failed to consider that the Claimant did, in fact, conduct several
events during and directly after the ramp up period. (CA 108-109.) But, these events
were so mismanaged and poorly planned, that many of the events did not bring in any
money and ended up actually costing the Employer mondy. (CA 108-109.) What is the
24

proper length of time the Board would require of the Employer to wait for this long-term
commitment to pay off? It seems that ninety days was not long enough for the Board, but
would seven months, two years or even ten years be enough time? Simply because the
Claimant mentions that fund raising is a long-term process does not mean that the ninety
days he was afforded and had agreed was sufficient (and, for that matter, the entire seven
months of his employment as the Employer relaxed the fund raising goal to just simply
raising the amount he was paid) was not ample time to ramp up. (CA 010, 108.)
In addition, the Claimant simply postponed fund-raising events and projects rather
than actually work to resolve the various problems that arise with all fund-raising events
and projects. (CA 109.)

The Claimant also used the Employer's computer - and

apparently on the clock - to send resumes to other employers when he was supposed to
be raising funds for the Employer. (CA 110.) It is the Employer's suspicion that the
Claimant knew that he was not doing his job, and he simply hoped that he could postpone
events long enough until he had lined up another job. The fact that he was applying for
other positions while working for the Employer is also per se evidence of bad faith, it is
at least a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the
employment relationship, and certainly does not evidence good faith. See, e.g., Cook v.
Zions First Nat. Bank, 919 P.2d 56 (Utah App. 1996) (employee's owe their employers a
duty of loyalty and good faith and fair dealing).
The Board (again giving tremendous and unwarranted weight to the Claimant's
unsupported statements) inferred, on the Claimant's mere suggestion, that more time was
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needed to get his projects going and that that must be the reason that the Claimant failed
to raise funds. (Addendum B.) Such was simply not true, and such does not demonstrate
that the Claimant acted in good faith.
3.

Events after termination.

The Board erroneously concluded that the

Employer was able to "experience success in fund raising after the Claimant's discharge
[and it] likely had something to do with the events planned by the Claimant rather than
the Employer's success despite economic factors." (Addendum B.) Such is complete
speculation, however, with no bearing whatsoever to the record in this matter, or to
reality for that matter. The Claimant indicated that he had "12 to 13" events planned in
the future but he was unable to conduct them. (CA 040.) Such is also entirely untrue.
The Claimant actually had three events planned after he was terminated and none of the
events he had scheduled could actually be conducted, in large part because they were so
poorly planned and misconceived from the very beginning. (CA 109-110.)
Further, the employee who had, in addition to her own position as clinic manager,
conducted fund-raising after the Claimant was terminated was able to raise more than
three times every month the amount that the Claimant ever did, and such fund-raising
efforts were entirely her own work and had nothing to do whatsoever with the Claimant's
unsuccessful events/projects. (CA 118.) The Board's speculation that the Claimant's
fund-raising efforts were somehow responsible for her success is again pure speculation
and completely false. (Addendum B.) The only event of the Claimant that was remotely
close to being ready to conduct after his termination was the "Brilliant Smiles Toasting
26

Event" at the McCune mansion to be held on April 23, 2009. (CA 109, 118.) However,
the manager of the McCune mansion himself contacted the Employer the week before the
event to recommend canceling the event because it was so poorly planned, and because
the invitations had been sent out late and there were only a handful of tickets sold. (CA
118.) In fact, the failure of this event was the final straw for the Employer, and it directly
resulted in the Claimant's termination. (CA 109-110.)
4.

Failed to work and time clock

The Board further erroneously concludes

that the Employer failed to show that the Claimant did not work the requisite hours to
accomplish the financial goal and further that punching in/out for work had actually
contributed to the Claimant's failure. (Addendum B.) The latter is pure speculation and,
again, is simply not true. The Claimant was working so few hours as a salary employee
that he had to be switched to an hourly employee in an attempt to get him to physically
show up to work ("he wasn't there a lot. It seemed like he was leaving earlier... He
wasn't as hard of a worker as I had expected for that position.... We switched him to
hourly from salary because it seemed like he was leaving during the day."). (CA 035,
118-119.) The Claimant was regularly not physically present at work (when he was on
salary or when he was converted to hourly), and he was simply not doing his job, either at
the Employer's office, his home, or on the golf course ("we weren't certain how much
time he [the Claimant] was spending there [at the office], so it was critical for us to
ensure that he was there full time- at least full time because he was getting paid as such.
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And when there were no results, and he wasn't there-had he been achieving the results, it
wouldn't have been a problem."). (CA 035, 118-119.)
Further, the Claimant's excuse (and again the Board's inexplicable agreement by
the mere unsupported suggestion of the idea) that the "difficult" process of clocking in
and out as an hourly employee somehow hampered his ability to perform the job is
beyond preposterous. (Addendum B, CA 035.) Employees of all ilk have to punch in
and out and/or they have to account in some way for their time worked, why should he be
any different?

It is difficult to understand how the Board could conclude that an

employee cannot do his/her job simply because of a requirement to keep track of his/her
hours. (Addendum B.) The Board seems to have mistaken the need to account for his
time with physically being present in the office to punch an actual time clock, as if he
could not conduct an event or meet with donor because he had to come back to the office
to physically punch a time card. Rather, the Claimant was allowed to write in his time
should events require that he be out of the office, and such a requirement to simply
account for when he worked did not interfere whatsoever with meeting potential donors
and conducting events, etc., as the Board in its decision speculates. (CA 110.) In fact,
the executive director of the Employer herself has to keep track of her time worked (at
the office, at home, or otherwise) as she must, pursuant to requirements of auditors and
many government grantors, split the percentage of her and all employee's time between
administration, fund raising, and the actual non-profit mission work. (CA 110.)
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5.

Keeping the Claimant employed longer. The Board additionally and again

erroneously concludes in its decision that, had the Claimant been employed longer, he
may have been able to meet the Employer's expectations (he had had a "relatively short
duration of employment"). (Addendum B.) The Claimant, however, was employed for
nearly seven months, and he earned a grand total of $16,065 for the Employer, but he
actually cost the Employer much more. (CA 009, 029-030, 106.) This means that, to
meet the Claimant's and the Employer's agreed upon financial goal, which the Claimant
admitted was reasonable and obtainable (assuming he acted in good faith), he would have
had to raise $170,935 in just over five months to reach the $187,500 goal. (CA 012,
036.) After seven months with the Employer, the Claimant had managed to raise less
than 10% of the amount required to be raised for the entire year and had not raised
enough to pay a fraction of his own wages. (CA 009, 029-030, 106) As discussed above,
at what point does is the Employer expected to continue working with the Claimant when
it was obvious to everyone involved, including the Claimant (who had began looking for
other work months before he was terminated), that the Claimant was simply not making a
good faith effort to do his job?
6.

He did his best. The Board was inexplicably persuaded by the Claimant's

mere suggestion that he did the best he could, and such was apparently sufficient for the
Board to demonstrate that he had made a good faith effort to do the job. (Addendum B.)
This, however, is again simply not true based on the facts. The Claimant previously
managed fund raising for an organization twice the size of the Employer, and he was
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apparently successful in that job; presumably he did his best for that organization. (CA
106-107, 115.)

Why, then, the disparate results before and after working for the

Employer if he were truly doing his best for the Employer? The answer is simply that the
Claimant did not put forth his best effort, and specifically did not make a good faith
effort, to succeed with the Employer. Had he done so, as evidenced by his previous
efforts with other organizations, he would have succeeded raising the requisite funds for
the Employer (or at least come close and earn enough to cover his own wages).
7.

Falsifying his time card. The Board failed to consider that the Claimant

committed fraud, which is by definition not acting in good faith, when he was caught
falsifying his time card by indicating that he left the office at 4:15 p.m. when the security
system indicated that he had actually left at 1:03 p.m. (Addendum B, CA 110-111.) On
the day in question, the Claimant was working alone in the Office, and the Employer tried
to reach him by telephone at around 2 p.m., but there was no response. (CA 110-111.)
Curious that he would be out of the office in the middle of the afternoon, the Employer
checked the security system and found that the Claimant had indeed falsified his time
card. (CA Oil, 110-111.) Falsifying time cards is itself good cause for termination. See,
e.g., Golchin v. Dept. of Workforce Services, 2005 WL 120869 (Utah App.
2005)(falsifying time cards to receive a higher rate of pay constituted just cause
termination of employment).
8.

Lying on his resume. As further evidence that the Claimant did not act in

good faith, but rather acted in bad faith, is that the Claimant lied on his resume, and
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throughout his employment with the Employer, about his level of education and about his
ability to speak conversational Spanish, both important factors for the Employer in hiring
him initially and as material part of his job generally. (CA 111, 114-115.) Falsifying job
applications and/or work records itself constitutes just cause for termination and is per se
acting in bad faith (see discussion below).
Distinguished from exhibiting isolated instances of errors in judgment, the
Claimant exhibited a pattern of bad-faith conduct, committing fraud in at least one
instance. In its decision, the Board speculated erroneously on various excuses as to why
the Claimant's failed to do his job, but the uncontested facts in this matter demonstrate
that the Claimant simply did not act in good faith. Accordingly, the Claimant's behavior
or conduct was within his power and capacity to control, he just simply chose not to do
his job. The two parts of the control element of just cause have been met.
III.

THE BOARD FAILED TO CONSIDER OR RULE ON THE EMPLOYER'S
SUPPLEMENTAL GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION THAT
DEMONSTRATES JUST CAUSE FOR TERMINATION.
In Utah, falsifying job applications and/or work records constitutes just cause for

termination. See, e.g., R994-405-208(3)("Falsification of Work Record. The duty of
honesty is inherent in any employment relationship. An employee or potential employee
has an obligation to truthfully answer material questions posed by the employer or
potential employer...."); R994-405-208(l)(Violation of employer's reasonable policy
against lying is "just cause" for termination); Golchin v. Dept. of Workforce Services,
2005 WL 120869 (Utah App. 2005)(falsifying time cards to receive a higher rate of pay
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constituted just cause termination of employment). Pursuant to McKennon v. Nashville
Banner, 513 U.S. 352 (1995), and Calvert v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 2007
WL 4207198 (D. Utah 2007), the Employer may supplement the grounds for termination
based upon information discovered thereafter.
On or about September 28, 2009, the day after the hearing took place in this
matter, the Employer discovered that the Claimant had lied about his level of education
on his resume, lied about his education level in his interview for employment with the
Employer, and continued to lie about his education level throughout his employment with
the Employer. (CA 111, 114-115.) He further lied on his resume about his ability to
speak, at a conversational level, Spanish. (CA 111, 114-115.) Both of which were
required by the Employer for the position, material to the Claimant's job, and without
which the Employer would not have hired the Claimant. (CA 111, 114-115.) The Board
in its decision, however, failed to consider or address such supplemental grounds for
termination introduced by the Employer. (Addendum B.)
CONCLUSION
As the Employer clearly and sufficiently demonstrated the elements of knowledge
and control with respect to the termination of the Claimant, and the Employer has also
supplemented its grounds for termination of the Claimant, the Claimant was terminated
for just cause. The Employer, as a reimbursable employer, is therefore entitled to relief
from charges for any unemployment benefits the Claimant has received or will receive.
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ADDENDUM A
Utah Admin. Code § R994-405-202(2) ("Rule 2")
Knowledge. The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct
the employer expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate
intent to harm the employer; however, it must be shown the claimant
should have been able to anticipate the negative effect of the conduct.
Generally, knowledge may not be established unless the employer gave a
clear explanation of the expected behavior or had a written policy, except in
the case of a violation of a universal standard of conduct. A specific
warning is one way to show the claimant should have been given an
opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a
progressive disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it
generally must have been followed for knowledge to be established, except
in the case of very severe infractions, including criminal actions.
Utah Admin. Code § R994-405-202(3) ("Rule 3")
Control.
(a) The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the
claimant's control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in
judgment are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However,
continued inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care
expected of a reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the
element of control if the claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily.
(b) The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it
may be necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance
standards. While such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge,
this does not mean benefits will be denied. To satisfy the element of
control in cases involving a discharge due to unsatisfactory work
performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to perform the
job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a good
faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of
skill or ability and a discharge results, just cause is not established.

ADDENDUM B

Fom, BRDEC
ISSUE 5

WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD
Department of Workforce Services
Division of Adjudication

STEPHEN P. VUYK, CLAIMANT
S.S.A. No. XXX-XX-1289

:
:

Case No. 09-B-01144

SALT LAKE DONATED DENTAL
SERVICES, INC.,
EMPLOYER
:
DECISION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge is affirmed.
Benefits are allowed.
HISTORY OF CASE:
In a decision dated September 22, 2009, Case No. 09-A-12879, the Administrative Law Judge
affirmed the Department decision and allowed unemployment insurance benefits to the Claimant
effective July 5, 2009. The Employer, Salt Lake Donated Dental Services, Inc., was ineligible for
relief of benefit charges in connection with this claim.
JURISDICTION OF WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD:
The Workforce Appeals Board has authority to review the Administrative Law Judge's decision
pursuant to §35A-4-508(4) and (5) of the Utah Employment Security Act and the Utah
Administrative Code (1997) pertaining thereto.
EMPLOYER APPEAL FILED: September 28, 2009.
ISSUES BEFORE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD AND APPLICABLE PROVISIONS
OF UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT:
1.

Did the Employer have just cause for discharging the Claimant pursuant to the provisions of
§35A-4-405(2)(a)?

2.

Is the Employer eligible for relief of charges pursuant to the provisions of §3 5 A-4-3 07( 1)?

FACTUAL FINDINGS:
The Workforce Appeals Board adopts in full the factual findings of the Administrative Law Judge.
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REASONING AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
The Claimant worked for the Employer as a deputy director from September 29, 2008, until his
discharge on April 16, 2009. The Claimant's job description required that he raise $15,625 per
month. At a minimum, he was required to raise $5,500 per month to pay for his salary. The
Claimant struggled raising funds for the Employer. He met with the Employer on two separate
occasions in January 2009 to discuss meeting his fund raising goals. After that, the Claimant began
meeting monthly with the Employer to discuss his progress.
The Claimant never met the Employer's fund raising expectations, raising an average of $3,489 per
month during the course of his employment. Because he failed to raise the requisite funds each
month to pay for his salary, the Employer was forced to use its reserve funds to pay the Claimant's
salary. The Employer issued a written warning to the Claimant on April 9, 2009, in which the
Employer warned the Claimant that failure to meet the Employer's fund raising expectations could
result in his discharge. Ultimately, the Employer discharged the Claimant on April 16, 2009 for
failure to meet the Employer's fund raising expectations.
The Administrative Law Judge found the Employer failed to establish that the Claimant was
negligent in his duties or that the Claimant's failure was due to negligence or lack of effort. The
Administrative Law Judge further determined that while culpability was established, the Employer
failed to establish knowledge and control sufficient to show just cause for the Claimant's discharge.
On appeal to the Board, the Employer argues that it established knowledge in that the Claimant
understood the expectations of the job included certain fund raising goals and that he was warned
regarding his failure to meet expectations on numerous occasions. The Employer further argues that
it established the element of control by establishing the Claimant's ability to do the job, that it was
possible to meet the fund raising expectations, and that the Claimant failed to make a good faith
effort to do so.
The Unemployment Insurance Rules pertaining to §35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment
Security Act provide, in pertinent part:
R994-405-202. Just Cause.
To establish just cause for a discharge, each of the following three elements
must be satisfied:
(1)

Culpability.

(2)

Knowledge.
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The claimant must have had knowledge of the conduct the employer
expected. There does not need to be evidence of a deliberate intent to harm the
employer; however, it must be shown the claimant should have been able to
anticipate the negative effect of the conduct. Generally, knowledge may not be
established unless the employer gave a clear explanation of the expected behavior or
had a written policy, except in the case of a violation of a universal standard of
conduct A specific warning is one way to show the claimant had knowledge of the
expected conduct. After a warning the claimant should have been given an
opportunity to correct the objectionable conduct. If the employer had a progressive
disciplinary procedure in place at the time of the separation, it generally must have
been followed for knowledge to be established, except in the case of very severe
infractions, including criminal actions.
(3)

Control.

(a)
The conduct causing the discharge must have been within the
claimants control. Isolated instances of carelessness or good faith errors in judgment
are not sufficient to establish just cause for discharge. However, continued
inefficiency, repeated carelessness or evidence of a lack of care expected of a
reasonable person in a similar circumstance may satisfy the element of control if the
claimant had the ability to perform satisfactorily.
(b)
The Department recognizes that in order to maintain efficiency it may
be necessary to discharge workers who do not meet performance standards. While
such a circumstance may provide a basis for discharge, this does not mean benefits
will be denied. To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due
to unsatisfactory work performance, it must be shown the claimant had the ability to
perform the job duties in a satisfactory manner. In general, if the claimant made a
good faith effort to meet the job requirements but failed to do so due to a lack of skill
or ability and a discharge results, just cause is not established.
In order to establish just cause for a discharge, the Employer must satisfy all three elements of the
just cause standard. Here, the Employer failed to satisfy the elements of control and knowledge
necessary to show just cause.
On appeal, the Employer cites the job description signed by the Claimant on October 2, 2008, as
proof that the Claimant had the necessary knowledge and skills to meet the Employer's expectations.
Signing the document indicates that the Claimant knew he was expected to meet certain fund raising
goals each month. It is not proof, however, that the Claimant was capable of meeting those
expectations or that failure to meet them meant the Claimant failed to make a good faith effort to do
so.
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The Employer also cites the self-serving "discipline log" created by the Employer to show the
Claimant had received a number of written and verbal warnings. There is no indication on the
document when it was prepared, if the Claimant ever saw the document, or if the specific acts
detailed in the document were ever discussed with the Claimant. The only written warning ever
received by the Claimant was the Counseling Notice, issued on April 9,2009, which stated that the
Claimant had failed to meet expectations, which could result in his discharge. There is no evidence
or testimony that the acts detailed in the discipline log, other than fund raising and a switch to hourly
wages, were ever discussed with the Claimant. While the Claimant understood the fund raising
expectations, and while he and the Employer reviewed his progress each month, he was never put
on notice that failure to meet the expectations would result in his termination until the issuance of
the written warning, which was only several days before he was discharged. Until that time, the
Claimant did not know that his conduct would lead to his discharge. As such, the Employer failed
to establish the element of knowledge.
To satisfy the element of control in cases involving a discharge due to unsatisfactory work
performance, the Employer must show the Claimant had the ability to perform the job duties in a
satisfactory manner. Rather than show the Claimant had the knowledge and skills necessary to meet
its expectations, the Employer testified that the Claimant never reached the Employer's expectations
during the course of his employment. Whether the Claimant stated he could reach that goal is
immaterial. The Claimant made a good faith effort to succeed with the Employer, but was hampered
by the economy, by the long-term nature of fund raising, and by the fact that most of the events he
planned happened after he was discharged. Further, despite its argument on appeal, the Employer
failed to establish a single event that the Claimant postponed because he was unprepared. The
Employer also failed to establish that the Claimant did not work the requisite hours to accomplish
the goal and it appears that the Employer's attempt to manage the Claimant's time actually
contributed to the Claimant's failure. The Claimant testified that it was difficult to clock in and out
as an hourly employee and still meet with potential donors and plan events in the community.
The Claimant may have been able to meet the Employer's expectations had he been employed longer.
The Claimant testified that he did the best he could. The Claimant specifically testified that he
planned as many as twelve or thirteen events throughout the year, including golf tournaments,
motorcycle rides, events with local sports teams, and a gala with ecclesiastical leaders. Many of
these events did not happen until after the Claimant was discharged. The fact that the Employer was
able to experience success in fund raising after the Claimant's discharge likely had something to do
with the events planned by the Claimant rather than the Employer's success despite economic factors.
The Employer neither established that the Claimant had the necessary skills and ability to meet the
Employer's expectations nor established that the Claimant was not hampered by outside factors, such
as the economy or the relatively short duration of his employment. As such, the Employer failed to
establish the element of control.
The Board adopts the Administrative Law Judge's reasoning and conclusions of law in full.
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DECISION:
The decision of the Administrative Law Judge allowing unemployment insurance benefits to the
Claimant effective July 5,2009, under the provisions of §35A-4-405(2)(a) of the Utah Employment
Security Act is affirmed.
APPEAL RIGHTS:
Pursuant to §63-46b-13(l)(a) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, you may request
reconsideration of this decision within 20 days from the date this decision is issued. Your request
for reconsideration must be in writing and must state the specific grounds upon which relief is
requested. The request must be filed with the Workforce Appeals Board at 140 East 300 South,
Salt Lake City, Utah, or may be mailed to the Workforce Appeals Board at P.O. Box 45244,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0244. A copy of the request for reconsideration must also be mailed to
each party by the person making the request. If the Workforce Appeals Board does not issue an
order within 20 days after the filing of the request, the request for reconsideration shall be considered
to be denied pursuant to §63-46b-13(3)(b) of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act. The filing
of a request for reconsideration is not a prerequisite for seeking judicial review of this order. If a
request for reconsideration is made, the Workforce Appeals Board will issue another decision. This
decision will set forth the rights of further appeal to the Court of Appeals and time limitation for
such an appeal.
You may appeal this decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. Your appeal must be submitted in
writing within 30 days of the date this decision is issued. The Court of Appeals is located on the
fifth floor of the Scott M. Matheson Courthouse, 450 South State Street, P. O. Box 140230,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230. The appeal must show the Workforce Appeals Board,
Department of Workforce Services and any other party to the proceeding as Respondents. To file
an appeal with the Court of Appeals, you must submit to the Clerk of the Court a Petition for Writ
of Review setting forth the reasons for appeal, pursuant to §35 A-4-508(8) of the Utah Employment
Security Act; §63-46b-16 of the Utah Administrative Procedures Act; and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, followed by a Docketing Statement and a Legal Brief as required by Rules 9
and 24-27, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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